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Abstract
The major advantages of arbitration are that the disputes are resolved
more expeditiously and cost effectively than in court.
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I. INTRODUCTION
If a man shall steal an ox, or a sheep, and kill it, or sell it; he shall
restorefive oxen for an ox, andfour sheep for a sheep.

Arbitration is an effective alternative method to litigation which
alleviates the tremendous strain currently burdening our judicial system.?
Disputes submitted to arbitration are resolved by arbitrators.3 A model
arbitrator is impartial, knowledgeable, and well versed in the area of
controversy.4 A popular type of dispute frequently resulting in arbitration
is securities transactions.'

1. Exodus 22:1 (King James).
2. Anthony M. Sabino, Awarding PunitiveDamages In SecuritiesIndustry Arbitration:
Working For A Just Result, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 33, 33 (1992).
3. SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, ARBITRATION PROCEDURES,

at 3 (1989).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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The major advantages of arbitration are that the disputes are resolved
more expeditiously and cost effectively than in court. Additionally, the
arbitrator's decision is final and binding, with limited grounds for reversal.7
Therefore, time and money, the two most important concerns of investors
and brokerage firms, are saved
Until recently, one of the uncertainties in securities arbitration was the
power of the arbitrators to award punitive damages. 9 Punitive damages are
defined as compensation in "excess of actual damages" and are awarded
"only in instances of malicious and willful misconduct."'"
The dual
purpose of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer and to deter similar
future misconduct." The question of whether securities arbitrators have
the power to award punitive damages was decided on March 6, 1995, when
the United States Supreme Court decided Mastrobuonov. ShearsonLehman
Hutton, Inc.,2 holding that, under the parties' agreement, arbitrators had
punitive power. 3 However, the decision, based on contractual interpretation, did not universally empower securities arbitrators with the power to
award punitive damages. Rather, the Court stated that contracting parties
are free to agree to include punitive damages within the arbitrable issues."
The Mastrobuono decision will affect not only investors and brokerage
firms, but also attorneys who practice in this complicated area of law.
This article first analyzes two recent cases which have conflicting
holdings and rationales concerning the power of arbitrators to award
punitive damages. 5 Next, the article discusses how the United States
Supreme Court seemingly resolved this conflict. Additionally, the article
explains some of the policy reasons behind giving securities arbitrators the
power to award punitive damages. Finally, the article concludes with

6. Id.
7. See infra note 129.
8. See Sabino, supra note 2, at 33.
9. Marilyn B. Cane, Punitive Damages in SecuritiesArbitration: The Interplayof State
and FederalLaw (Or a Smaller Bite of the Big Apple), 1993 J. DisP. RESOL. 153, 153.
10. BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 117 (3d ed. 1991).
11. Id.
12. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., No. 94-18, 1995 WL 86555 (Mar.
6, 1995).
13. Id.at *6.
14. Id.at *4.
15. See generally Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d 713 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 305
(1994), and rev'd, No. 94-18, 1995 WL 86555 (Mar. 6, 1995); J. Alexander Sec., Inc. v.
Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826 (2d Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2182 (1994).
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recommendations on how the various arbitral forums can improve the
arbitration system.
II. CONFLICT AMONG THE COURTS
The Second and Seventh Circuits of the United States Court of Appeals
have held that securities arbitrators do not have the power to award punitive
damages. 16 This was in direct conflict with the majority view, and, prior
to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mastrobuono, was the
cause of the legal inconsistency that baffled many arbitrators, judges, and
attorneys.17
A.

Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.: The Minority
View

The Seventh Circuit's most recent decision concerning the issue of
punitive damages in securities arbitration was Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc.' In 1985, the plaintiff-appellants, Antonio and Diana
Mastrobuono, opened a securities account with Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc. (Shearson). 9 The client agreement between the plaintiffs and
Shearson provided, in relevant part: "This agreement... shall be governed
by the laws of the State of New York .... [A]ny controversy arising out
of or relating to [the plaintiffs'] accounts ...shall be settled by arbitration
",20

In 1989, the plaintiffs sued Shearson in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, claiming unauthorized trading, churning,
and breach of fiduciary duty.21 Plaintiffs requested compensatory as well
as punitive damages; 22 however, Shearson successfully moved to compel
arbitration before the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD").2
16. See, e.g., Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 714; Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc.,
948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991).
17. Cf Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1991);
Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989); Bonar v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378 (11th Cir. 1988).
18. 20 F.3d 713.
19. Id. at 715.
20. Id. Additionally, the agreement provided the plaintiff with the choice of the arbitral

forum. Id.
21. Id.
22. Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 715.
23. Id.

Published by NSUWorks, 1995

3

Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 8

1066

Nova Law Review

Vol. 19

After hearing the arguments of both sides, the arbitrators awarded the
plaintiffs $159,327.00 in compensatory damages and $400,000.00 in
punitive damages.24 Shearson filed a motion in the district court to vacate
the award of punitive damages, 25 arguing that New York law, the governing law of the client agreement, denied arbitrators the power to award
punitive damages. 26 The district court granted Shearson's motion and
vacated the punitive damages award. 27 The plaintiffs appealed, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.2 8
First, the court of appeals rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
district court violated the scope of review imposed by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). 29 The court explained that "the FAA permits a court to
vacate an award '[w]here the arbitrators exceeded their powers. '
Furthermore, in order to support the decision, the court relied heavily upon
the Second Circuit's rationale in Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc. 31 The Barbier court stated that when arbitrators are not empowered
with the ability to award punitive damages due to a choice of law provision
in the parties' agreement, then the arbitrators would exceed their powers by
awarding such damages. 32 Therefore, in the instant case, the court of
appeals held that the lower court properly reviewed the arbitrator's authority
to award punitive damages.33
The court then examined the arbitration agreement itself and recognized
that it contained a New York choice of law provision.34 Under New York
law, arbitrators cannot award punitive damages; this is referred to as the
Garrityrule.35 The plaintiffs' argument that the FAA preempts the Garrity
rule, and thereby authorizes the arbitrators to award punitive damages, was
rejected. 36 The court explained that the policy supporting the FAA "is
simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 716.
Id. at 719.
Id. at 716.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (1988)).
948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 122.
Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 716.
Id.
Id. (citing Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976)).
Id.
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'
agreements to arbitrate."37
Therefore, following the rationale of Volt,38
the court enforced the parties' agreement according to its terms, which was
to arbitrate all of their controversies under New York law.39
The Seventh Circuit continued its reasoning by examining a case
similar to Mastrobuono, which was decided in the same circuit ten years
earlier.40 In Pierson," a brokerage agreement also contained a New York
choice of law provision.42 The court reasoned that although the Piersons
may not have realized that the wording of the arbitration clause precluded
a punitive damage award, they could not "use their failure to inquire about
the ramifications of that clause to avoid the consequences of agreed-to
arbitration." '3 Relying on Pierson, the Mastrobuono court concluded that
the choice of law provision incorporated the Garrity rule." Therefore,
since New York law applied, and securities arbitrators did not have the
power to award punitive damages in New York, the court found that the
arbitrators exceeded their authority."
The Mastrobuonos then argued that the arbitration rules of the NASD
clearly authorized arbitrators to award punitive damages."6 The court
disposed of this argument by explaining that New York law applies no
matter which arbitral forum the plaintiffs happen to choose."7 The court
explained that the parties did not intend for the availability of punitive
damages to vary with the plaintiffs' choice of arbitration rules."8 Therefore, the arbitration agreement, signed by the Mastrobuonos, enforced the
Garrity rule whether the arbitration occurred at the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE"), NASD, or any other arbitral forum."9
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Mastrobuonoreinforced the minority
view that securities arbitrators did not have the power to award punitive
damages. The Second Circuit was the only other federal court of appeals

37. Id. (quoting Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 476

(1989)).
38. Volt, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
39. Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 717.
40. Id. (citing Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1984)).
41. Pierson,742 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1984).
42. Id. at 336.

43. Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 717 (quoting Pierson, 742 F.2d at 339).
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 718.
Id.
Id.
Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 718.
Id.
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which subscribed to this view.50 Some of the possible reasons these two
courts had for taking their stance against punitive damages will be explored
later in this article.
The Mastrobuonos appealed to the United States Supreme Court. On
March 6, 1995, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in
Mastrobuono,holding that the choice of law provision in the parties' client
agreement covered the rights and duties of the parties, while the arbitration
clause covered arbitration, thus giving the arbitrators the power to award
punitive damages. 5 The decision is analyzed in Part III of this article.
B. J Alexander Securities, Inc. v. Mendez: The Majority View
Mendez was decided by a California state court of appeal." Although
this case was decided at the state level, the opinion represents the majority
view of the federal courts. 3 The majority holds that securities arbitrators
have the power to award punitive damages, even though a New York choice
of law provision is present.54 In making its decision, the Mendez court
relied upon the rationales of previous cases which were decided in the First,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. 5
In 1980, Signe Mendez, an elderly widow, opened a securities account
with J. Alexander Securities, Inc., a brokerage firm located in Los Angeles. 56 Upon opening the account, Mendez signed a Cash Account Agreement which contained an arbitration clause for disputes, as well as a New
York choice of law provision."

50. See, e.g., Barbier, 948 F.2d at 117.
51. Mastrobuono, 1995 WL 86555, at *6.
52. Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826.
53. See generallyTodd Shipyards,943 F.2d at 1062 (relying on federal law, rather than
New York law, the court held that the arbitrators had the authority to award punitive
damages); Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 12 (upholding a punitive damage award rendered by a
commercial arbitration panel, whereby the agreement expressly provided that all disputes
would be settled by arbitration according to the rules of the American Arbitration
Association); Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387 (holding that a choice of law provision in an
arbitration agreement does not deprive arbitrators of their power to award punitive damages).
54. E.g., Todd Shipyards, 943 F.2d at 1062; Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387.
55. See Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 829 (citing Todd Shipyards, 943 F.2d at 1062;
Raytheon, 882 F.2d at II; Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387).
56. Id. at 826-27.
57. Id. at 827. The agreement stated, in pertinent part:
This agreement and its enforcement shall be governed by the laws of the
State of New York .... Any dispute or controversy between us arising under
any provision of the federal securities laws can be resolved through litigation in
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A dispute arose in 1991, whereby Mendez claimed that the brokerage
firm and the broker, Weber, had engaged in securities fraud, deceptive
practices, churning, unsuitability, and unauthorized stock trading." As a
result, Mendez suffered substantial financial losses.59 The parties agreed
to arbitrate their dispute at the NASD, and hearings on the controversy were
conducted in 1992.60 The arbitrators awarded Mendez $27,000.00 in
compensatory damages, as well as $27,000.00 in punitive damages against
the firm only."' The arbitrators explained that the firm failed to adequately
supervise its employee, Weber, thereby, not meeting the required standards
to assure compliance with applicable securities regulations.62
The firm proceeded to the trial court and moved to correct the award
pursuant to the California Code of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that the
arbitrators had exceeded their powers by awarding punitive damages.6 3
The trial court denied the motion and confirmed the award; however, the
firm appealed." The court of appeal affirmed and provided a thorough
explanation.6
The court held that the arbitrators were not precluded from awarding
punitive damages by virtue of the New York choice of law provision. 6
The reasoning was based on the cash account agreement, which "evidenced
a transaction in interstate commerce[;]" therefore, the FAA applied. 7 The
court explained that the purpose of the FAA is to encourage arbitration, and
the underlying principle is that any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration. 8 The court
refused to follow the minority view of the Second Circuit which held that
state law is not preempted by federal substantive law on the issue of
the courts if the undersigned so chooses. The undersigned also understands that
arbitration is available with respect to such disputes. Additionally, all other
disputes or controversies between us arising out of your business or this
agreement, shall be submitted to arbitration conducted under the provisions of
the [rules of the NYSE or NASD], as the undersigned may elect ....

Id. at 827-28.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 828.
Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 828.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (referring to CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1286.6(b) (1993)).
Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 828.
Id. at 829.
Id.
Id. at 830.
Id. (citing Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)).
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punitive damage awards by securities arbitrators. 69 Rather, the court
concluded that the choice of law provision designates only the substantive
law that the arbitrators must apply in determining whether the parties'
conduct warrants an award of punitive damages; it does not deprive them
of the power to award such damages.7"
The firm also contended that there was nothing in the parties'
agreement which permitted punitive damages. 7' The court agreed, but
stated that there was also nothing in the agreement that expressly excluded
the possibility of a punitive damage award either.7" The court held that the
arbitration provision "contained in the Cash Account Agreement encompassed 'any dispute or controversy between [the parties] arising under any
provision of the Federal securities laws' and 'all other disputes or controversies between [the parties] arising out of [appellant's] business or this
agreement."' 73 Therefore, the court found the arbitration agreement broad
enough to contemplate punitive damages.74
The appellant then argued that the agreement to arbitrate under the
rules of the NYSE or the NASD, which are silent on the issue of punitive
damages, exemplified that such an award was not contemplated by the
parties.75 The court rejected this argument based on public policy which
was enunciated by other federal courts that punitive damage awards clearly
support arbitration as an effective method of resolving disputes.76 The
court explained that the failure of the NASD to expressly state in its rules
that the arbitrators have the power to award punitive damages should not bar
the availability of that remedy.77 Therefore, in the absence of an express
provision in the Cash Account Agreement or an NASD rule prohibiting an
award of punitive damages, the arbitrators did not exceed their powers.7"
There was a constitutional question of due process raised by the
appellant which the court also rejected.7 9 The appellant, relying on a

69. Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 830 n.7 (citing Barbier,948 F.2d at 122; Fahnestock
& Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 518 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1120 (1992), and
affd, 989 F.2d 490 (3d.Cir. 1993)).
70. Id. (citing Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id.; see also supra note 55.
74. Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83 1.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 832.
79. Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 832.
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United States Supreme Court case, contended an absence of constraints upon
the arbitrators and a lack of judicial review."0 Similar arguments were also
rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line,
Ltd.8 1
In Todd Shipyards, the court found that the punitive damage award
rendered by an arbitration panel did not violate due process because the
appellant had notice that the respondent sought punitive damages, and was
given the opportunity to argue its position by presenting evidence. 2
Relying on Todd Shipyards, the judge explained that the appellant did not
claim that it lacked notice of Mendez's claim for punitive damages, nor that
it was unable to present evidence or legal theories against such an award. 3
Therefore, no violation of due process occurred. 4
A California case, Baker v. Sadick,"5 was relied upon to quickly
dispose of the lack of judicial review issue. 6 Baker involved a punitive
damage award in a medical malpractice claim which was submitted to
arbitration. 7 The court in Baker held that although the arbitration
agreement was broad, the parties had the power to control the scope of that
agreement.8 8 Similarly, the parties in the instant case could have expressly
agreed, in the Cash Account Agreement, to no awards of punitive damages;
but they did not. 9 Consequently, the lack of judicial review argument was
rejected.9" The court of appeal upheld the punitive damage award and the
California Supreme Court denied review.91 The firm then filed a petition
for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, but it was
denied.92 Nevertheless, an interesting dissent followed the denial of
certiorari.93

80. Id. (citing Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)).
81. 943 F.2d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 1991).
82. Id.

83. Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 833.
84. Id.

85. 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (4th Ct. App. 1984).
86. See Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 833.
87. See Baker, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
88. Id. at 684.

89. See Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 827.
90. Id. at 833.
91. Id.

92. Mendez, 114 S. Ct. 2182.
93. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., & O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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C. The Mendez Dissent
Although Mendez was denied certiorari, a clear and concise dissenting
opinion followed, evidencing much interest in settling the conflict among the
lower courts.94 After giving a brief description of the facts in Mendez,
Justice O'Connor recognized that the decision followed the majority view
which holds that the FAA preempts state law prohibitions of punitive
damages in arbitration. 95 However, she explained that the decision was
directly contrary to the views of the Second and Seventh Circuits, which
held that state law was not preempted by federal substantive law for the
purpose of an arbitrator's power to award punitive damages.9 6 Realizing
that the FAA was created to avoid these differences, she would have granted
certiorari to solve the recurring problem. 97
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN MASTROBUONO
One of the functions of the United States Supreme Court is to settle
conflicting decisions among the lower federal courts, especially when the
issue is of great public importance.98 The cases analyzed above demonstrate a direct conflict among the federal courts concerning the power of an
arbitrator to award punitive damages. 99 Additionally, since millions of
dollars are awarded in punitive damages in securities arbitrations every year,
the issue is of great public importance.' 0 This placed the Supreme Court
in an excellent position to rule on the issue. The Court, following the lead
of Justice O'Connor and the Chief Justice, realized that it was not up to the
legislature or the arbitral forums to resolve this issue; therefore, the
Mastrobuonos' petition for certiorari was granted.'
On March 6, 1995, by an eight to one decision,'0 ° the Supreme Court
reversed the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Mastrobuonoand granted arbitrators

See Mendez, 114 S. Ct. 2182 (Rehnquist, C.J., & O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. (citing Todd Shipyards, 943 F.2d at 1056; Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1378).
Id. (citing Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 713; Barbier, 948 F.2d at 117).
Id.
98. ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, § 4.2, at 165 (7th ed. 1993).
99. See generally Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 713; Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 826.
100. See generallyPunitiveAward Survey, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR. at 3 (May 1993)
[hereinafter SAC].
101. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. 305.
102. Justice Clarence Thomas was the lone dissenter. See Mastrobuono, 1995 WL
86555, at *6 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
94.
95.
96.
97.
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the power to award punitive damages.0 3 The majority opinion was
written by Justice Stevens and the central theme was that the FAA ensures
that arbitration agreements will be enforced according to their terms. °4
However, the New York choice of law provision contained in the parties'
agreement created an ambiguity.0 5 Applying common law rules of
contractual interpretation, the Court construed the ambiguous language
against the interest of the party0 6that drafted it; in this case, as in most, that
party was the brokerage firm.1
The Court then examined some of the NASD rules, as well as an
NASD manual given to the arbitrators which included a section permitting
the consideration of punitive damages." 7 The holding was also based on
the belief that it was unlikely that the plaintiffs were actually aware of the
New York choice of law provision which prohibited punitive damages in
arbitration.'
However, it was noted that parties can structure their
arbitration agreements as they see fit and specify by contract the rules under
which that arbitration will be conducted. 10 9
Although the decision appears to be a victory for disgruntled investors,
the Court's analysis left many issues unresolved. First, brokerage firms now
may consider rewording their customer agreements in order to clearly state
the unavailability of punitive damages. However, this could lead to the
issue of whether the agreements are contracts of adhesion, thereby making
the provisions unenforceable. Furthermore, the NASD rules provide, inter
alia, that no predispute arbitration agreement shall limit the ability of the
arbitrators to make any awardY" The Court recognized this rule; however, it was inapplicable in Mastrobuonobecause the agreement was executed
before the effective date of the rule."'
Additionally, before individuals contract away an "important substantive right" such as punitive damages, they should be made aware of the
implications of what they are doing." 2 A related issue pertains to the

103. Id.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Mastrobuono, 1995 WL 86555, at *5.
Id.

109. Id. at *3 (citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 479).
110. See NATIONAL ASS'N OF SECURITIES DEALERS, RULES OF FAIR PRACTICE

2171,

Rule 21(f)(4) (1993).
111. Rule 21(f)(4) only applies to agreements signed after September 7, 1989. See id.
Rule 21(f)(5). The Mastrobuonos signed their agreement in 1985.
112. See id. at *5.
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proper standard of review to be applied in arbitration appeals as to the scope
of an arbitration." 3 Considering these unanswered questions, it will be
interesting to note the impact this decision will have on securities arbitration.
IV.

ARBITRATOR USE OF THE POWER TO AWARD
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Many factors must be considered in empowering securities arbitrators
with the authority to award punitive damages. First, the use of punitive
power must be used only in instances in which the purposes of such
damages are served. Next, there must be a mechanism to ensure that
safeguards exist in order to prevent unjust awards. Finally, use of the
punitive power must be done in a way that keeps the arbitration process fair
and efficient.
A. Accomplishing the Purposes of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages, as stated earlier, serve two purposes: to punish the
wrongdoer and to deter similar future misconduct." 4 Members of the
securities industry must fear this type of punishment in order to help reduce
the amount of unscrupulous and malicious conduct that plagues this
otherwise professional field."'
The nature of the securities industry creates a fiduciary duty bestowed
upon the individual brokers and firms." 6 The brokers give financial
advice to their clients and then invest their money." 7 These brokers are
compensated on a commission basis which may cause a conflict of interest
between themselves and their clients." 8 The more frequently the client
buys and sells securities based on representations made by their broker, the
greater the commission the broker and his firm will earn. This conflict
sometimes leads to fraudulent conduct by the broker in order to generate
commissions."'9

113. The Court recently granted certiorari on this issue in First Options of Chicago. Inc.
v. Kaplan, 115 S.Ct. 634 (1994).
114. See BARRON's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 117.
115. Brief for Respondent at 14, In re Dreyfus Serv. Corp., 584 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1992)
(No. 11629/90).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.

19. This type of misconduct is known as "churning."
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If punitive damages are awarded against a broker or a firm for
fraudulent or grossly negligent conduct, the firm will surely eliminate such
behavior. 2 Conversely, if arbitrators had no authority to award punitive
damages, firms would lack incentive to strictly monitor their brokers'
behavior.' 2 ' Therefore, the misconduct would continue if the threat of
monetary punishment were limited to the amount actually lost.'22 Hopefully, the Supreme Court's decision in Mastrobuonowill help in this regard.
In addition to the deterrent effect of punitive damages, the threat of
such damages motivates settlement of securities disputes.'2 3 For instance,
if a firm realizes that the arbitrator lacks the authority to award punitive
damages, thereby only exposing the firm to limited liability, the likelihood
of a fair settlement offer is poor.'24 Moreover, the firm recognizes that
if the settlement offer is refused, then the investor must incur continued
expenses, such as forum fees, expert witnesses, and attorney's fees.' 25
These factors unfairly influence the investor in accepting a low settlement.
To the contrary, the empowerment of arbitrators with the authority to
award punitive damages should motivate firms in settlement negotiations.' 26 The threat of punitive damages, accompanied by the fear of the
unknown amount which could be awarded, should help end the disputes in
a quicker and more equitable manner.'2 7 Because the arbitrators now have
the power to grant punitive damages, the entire arbitration process benefits,
even if the power is not actually exercised.
B. Safeguards
The most popular argument used in opposing an arbitrator's power to
award punitive damages is the lack of judicial review.' 28 This stance is
in response to the narrow and limited grounds for vacating an award.' 2 9

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
only:

Brief for Respondent at 14, Dreyfus (No. 11629/90).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Brief for Respondent at 18, Dreyfis (No. 11629/90).
Id.
Id. at 19.
See, e.g., Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 832.
9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a) (West Supp. 1994). The statute permits an award to be vacated
(1)

Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.
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Although this argument is sensible, no court has held that the limited
judicial review given to arbitral awards denies the arbitration participants
due process. 30 Therefore, this argument consistently fails.' 3'
The fear of runaway arbitrators continuously awarding punitive
damages is another argument that is frequently employed by parties who
oppose the arbitrators power to award such damages.' 32 This theory
evolved from the court's reasoning in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.'33 In
Garrity,the court observed that unpredictable punitive damage awards may
occur as a result of the lack of guidelines for arbitral awards, as well as the
limited judicial review of the awards.' 34 Almost twenty years have passed
since Garrity,and the statistics now show that there is no need to fear that
arbitrators will abuse their power in granting punitive damages.'
In 1991, an extensive statistical analysis on this issue was written by
the Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association.' 36 The study, conducted
from June 1987 to December 1990, showed that out of approximately 1800
arbitration awards favoring investors, there were only forty-four punitive
damage awards.' 37 The low frequency of the punitive damage awards

(2)
(3)

(4)

(5)

Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,
or either of them.
Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced.
Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.
Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement
required the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its
discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.

Id.
130. Reply Brief for Respondent at 6, Dreyfus (No. 11629/90).
131. See, e.g., Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 832-33.
132. See, e.g., Todd Shipyards, 943 F.2d at 1061; Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 8.
133. 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
134. Id. at 796.
135. See generallyStuart C. Goldberg, 1991 Report Of The PublicInvestorsArbitration
Bar Association As To The Authority Of Arbitrators To Award Punitive Damages In
SecuritiesArbitration, 1991 PUB. INVESTORS ARB. B. ASS'N 1; see also SAC, supra note
100.
136. See generally Goldberg, supra note 135.
137. Id. at 109-10.
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demonstrates the arbitrators' reluctance to award such damages, unless
warranted by the situation.'3 8
Additionally, a similar study was performed by the Securities
Arbitration Commentator, which was published in May of 1993.'
This
study emphasized the proportionality ratios of punitive damage awards to
their compensatory damage counterpart. 40 The results showed that an
overwhelming majority of the awards fell into the 3:1 ratio; a fair and
equitable calculation.' 4 ' However, no exact line exists between an acceptable ratio and an unacceptable one; it is a matter of judgment.'4 2
No perfect formula exists in determining the size of a punitive damage
award.' 43 However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals offered guidance
in Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co.'44 The court concluded that three times
the compensatory damage award is a proper guideline in determining the
45
amount of punitive damages that should be awarded in a churning case.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has upheld punitive damage awards
that have exceeded the 3:1 ratio. 46 For instance, in Pacific Mutual Life
InsuranceCo. v. Haslip,14 ' a punitive damage award which was four times
the amount of the compensatory damages was upheld. 48 Additionally, in
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,"'9 the Court upheld
a $10,000,000.00 punitive damage award when the compensatory damages
were only $19,000.00, a ratio of approximately 526:1.150 Although these
two cases did not involve arbitration, they5 directly involved due process
limitations on awards of punitive damages.' '
The Supreme Court's decision in Mastrobuono,based on principles of
contractual interpretation, may not have alleviated all of the fears regarding

138. Id. at 110.
139. See generally SAC, supra note 100.
140. Id. at 4.
141. Id. at 5. Additionally, only 12% of the awards exceeded the 3:1 ratio. Id.
142. Id.
143. Goldberg, supra note 135, at 84.
144. 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 642 F.2d 1210 (1981).
145. Id. at 332.
146. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993);
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
147. 499 U.S. 1.
148. Id. at 24.
149. 113 S. Ct. 2711.
150. Id. at 2723.
151. See Haslip,499 U.S. at 9-15; see alsoTXO Production v. Alliance Resources: The
"Promise"Fades-LastWord on Punitives?, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, June 1993, at 2.
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arbitrators abusing their power in awarding punitive damages. The court
made no mention of delineating an acceptable measure of punitive damages,
such as the general 3:1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages. 152 The studies mentioned above show that the arbitrators generally
follow this guideline without expressly being told to do so. 53 The Court
could have expressed its opinion of whether this practice is fair and
equitable, but it did not do so.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Now that the Supreme Court has ruled in favor of arbitrators having the
authority to award punitive damages despite the presence of a New York
choice of law provision in securities client agreements, the arbitral forums
should implement guidelines and procedures for all to follow.' 54 This
would help to ensure that the punitive awards do not violate due process. 55 Moreover, these procedures will create a realistic
image that the
56
arbitrators award such damages fairly and reasonably.
First, the forums should require that the arbitration panel write out an
explanation on why it awarded punitive damages. 5 This will facilitate
any appeal of the ruling by notifying the appellate decision-maker of the
reasoning for the award. 5 Furthermore, the wrongdoer, as well as the
public, will know exactly why the award is being rendered, and this will
hopefully deter similar misconduct.' 59 Unfortunately, this requirement60has
not been created by any forum, although the NASD is considering it.'

152. See, e.g., Miley, 637 F.2d at 332.
153. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 135, at 110.
154. See generally NATIONAL Ass'N OF SECURITIES DEALERS. INC., NOTIcES TO

MEMBERS, July 1994 at 319-43 [hereinafter NASD].
155. Id. at 334.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 330.
158. Id.
159. NASD, supra note 154, at 330.
160. See id. (citing the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, § 41 (1992), which only
requires that the awards be in writing and include the names of the parties and counsel, a
summary of the issues, the relief requested and awarded, a statement of issues resolved, and
other names and dates). Similarly, the American Arbitration Association only requires that
the awards be in writing, signed by a majority of the arbitrators, and that they include a
statement regarding the disposition of statutory claims. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N,
SECURITIES ARBITRATION RULES § 42 (1987).
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Next, the party against whom the punitive damages are rendered should
reserve the right to appeal the punitive portion of the award. 6 ' As
described earlier in this article, the current arbitration system offers a limited
right to appeal, which courts interpret narrowly.'62 Therefore, the appeal
should include not only the amount of the award, but the actual decision to
award punitive damages itself.'6 3
This appeals process must not take place in the court system because
that would circumvent the original purpose of submitting to arbitration.' 64
Rather, the appellate body should consist of three individuals who are
selected from a pool of arbitrators who are experienced in securities cases
involving punitive damages. 6 The appellate panel should only vacate
awards in which the arbitrators' decision below was clearly erroneous.' 66
This system will serve as a check on the arbitrators' power to award
punitive damages, and at the same time, uphold the integrity of the entire
arbitration process.
The purpose of punitive damages is not to provide a windfall to the
plaintiff or plaintiffs' counsel.' 67 Therefore, the arbitral forums should
require that a portion of each punitive damage award be given to an
appropriate entity.'68 For instance, if fifty percent of all punitive awards
were dispersed to groups in need of the money, then every year millions of
dollars could be generated to help those groups tremendously.'6 9 The
money received could go, for example, to the arbitral forum where the
hearings took place, the state or federal courts, or even to the plaintiffs'
favorite charity. 7 In fact, some states already have this procedure in
place for punitive damages awarded in court.' 7 '

161. Id.
162. See supra note 129.
163. NASD, supra note 154, at 331.
164. See Sabino, supra note 2, at 33.
165. NASD, supra note 154, at 331.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 334 (stating that the purpose of awarding punitive damages is to punish
those who purposefully harm the investing public for their own personal gain); see also
BARRON's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 117.
168. NASD, supra note 154, at 334.
169. See Goldberg, supra note 135, at 7 (stating that over $9,000,000 was awarded in
punitive damages in securities arbitrations between June 1987 and Dec. 1990). Id.
170. NASD, supra note 154, at 334.
171. Id. (citing COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102(4) (1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73
(West Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675 (1991)).
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Even though the Supreme Court ruled in favor of empowering
securities arbitrators to award punitive damages, the arbitral forums must
further recognize the need to improve and expand the system. Implementing
the recommendations mentioned above would ensure equity and fairness
within the arbitration process.172
VI. CONCLUSION
The number of securities disputes submitted to arbitration every year
is continuously rising.'7 3 This is mainly attributed to the arbitration agreements which are usually contained in customer account forms, which public
investors sign upon the opening of their securities account.'7 4 In 1987, the
Supreme Court, in Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc. v. Mc-Mahon, 75 held
that these agreements are legally enforceable and are supported by public
policy which strongly favors arbitration.'7 6 The Supreme Court, in
deciding Mastrobuono, apparently took into consideration the brokerage
firms' success in closing the road to the courthouse and thereby detouring
disgruntled customers to arbitration. Although the decision resolved the
issue of whether the arbitrators in that case had the power to award punitive
damages, the decision was more limited than what would have been desired.
The Court should have universally empowered the arbitrators with the
authority to award punitive damages. The Court could have relied on the
rationale that the punishment and deterrent purposes of such damages would
be achieved, thus creating a more professional atmosphere among the
numerous securities firms and their employees. Additionally, the Court
could have recognized that although lacking strict guidelines, arbitrators
have yet to exemplify bad faith or corruption in awarding punitive
damages.' 77
The brokerage firms will still have the ability to avoid a punitive
damage award being rendered against them. The Court has held that under
the FAA, "parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements

172.
173.
file with
174.

Id.
See NASD Chart, Self Regulatory OrganizationArbitration Filings, 1980-93 (on
author).
Stuart C. Goldberg, PIABA's 1991 PUBLIC INVESTOR RECOVERY GUIDE AND

ARBITRATOR SOURCE BOOK TO STOCKBROKER FRAUD AND SECURITIES ARBITRATION at ix

(1991).
175. 482 U.S. 220, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987).
176. Id. at 242.
177. See Goldberg, supra note 135, at 110.
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as they see fit."'78 Therefore, if the brokerage firms use plain and clear
language which expressly prohibits punitive damages as a remedy under the
arbitration contract, then the arbitrators would not have the ability to award
such damages.' 79
The majority view empowered arbitrators with the authority to award
punitive damages, even when a New York choice of law provision was
present. 8
The minority view, which held that arbitrators lack such
powers, has apparently now been overruled by the Supreme Court's decision
in Mastrobuono.'' The Second and Seventh Circuits were the only
federal circuit courts which subscribed to the minority view. 2 Their
jurisdiction encompasses New York and Chicago, home to many large
securities firms and the markets in which they trade. Thus, the Supreme
Court's decision should have great impact on the securities industry.
However, the attack on the securities arbitrators' power to award punitive
damages will continue.
DarrenC. Blum

178. Volt, 489 U.S. at 479 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
179. E. Allan Farnsworth, Punitive Damagesin Arbitration,20 STETSON L. REv. 395,

409 (1991); see also Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 776 F.2d 269
(11th Cir. 1985). However, if the parties agree to arbitrate according to the NASD rules,
they will not be able to limit the arbitrators' ability to award punitive damages. See supra
note 110.
180. See, e.g., Todd Shipyards, 943 F.2d at 1062; Bonar,835 F.2d at 1387; Mendez, 21

Cal. Rptr. 2d at 829.
181. See Mastrobuono, 1995 WL 86555.
182. See supranote 16.
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